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VIII.

EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

When Does the Ninety Day Complaint Filing Period Begin

for 42 U.S.C. § 2OOe-5(9 (1)? Harvey v. City of New Bern
Police Department
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects the rights of employees
against discrimination in hiring, firing, and promotion.' Title VII also
provides remedies for violations of employees' rights. 2 An employee alleging
a violation of Title VII first must file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).3 If the employee's claim is valid
or prosecutable, the EEOC encourages the employer to comply with Title
VII and seeks conciliation between the employee and employer.4 If the
EEOC fails to convince the offending employer to comply with Title VII,
the EEOC files suit against the employer.' Alternatively, if the EEOC does
not find enough evidence to support its own action against the employer,
the EEOC issues a Right to Sue letter to the employee. 6 The Right to Sue
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982). Congress designed Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) to ensure that employees would have a cause
of action against employers who discriminated against the employees in employment practices.
Id. Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) as an
administrative body to hear employees' allegations of their employers' violations of Title VII.
Id.
2. Id. If the EEOC finds that sufficient evidence supports an employee's .llegations of
an employer's Title VII violations, the EEOC may file a lawsuit against the offending employer.
Id. The EEOC also may allow the employee to file charges against the employer, depending
on the circumstances of the employer's Title VII violation. Id.; see infra notes 3-7 and
accompanying text (discussing process of filing complaint with EEOC).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1982). After the alleged discriminatory action, an employee
has 180 days to file a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission..Id. §
2000e-5(e). The EEOC examines the employee's allegations and decides whether enough evidence
exists to support a claim against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The procedure for filing a
Title VII complaint against an employer changes if the state in which the unlawful employment
practice took place has its own agency to investigate an employee's claims of employment
discrimination. Id. § 2000e-5(c). If the state does not have its own agency, the EEOC follows
the EEOC's normal procedure. Id. If the state has established an agency to hear employees
claims of employment discrimination, the EEOC forwards the complaint to the state agency.
Id. The state agency has sixty days to complete its investigation. Id. After completing its
investigation, the state agency may file in a state court charges against the employer in
accordance with state administrative procedures. Id. § 2000e-5(d). If the state agency cannot
conciliate the employer and employee, then the state agency files its report with the EEOC,
and the EEOC proceeds against the employer who allegedly violated the Act. Id.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1982). Title VII establishes a conciliation period to try to
rectify the employer's violation of the Act without the plaintiff having to sue his employer in
court. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972-CoNlERENcE REPORT 118 Cong. Rec.
at 7166, 7168 (1972). Furthermore, supporters of Title VII indicated that, because of the
conciliation period, lawsuits would be the rare exception in discrimination cases. Id. at 7563.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
6. Id. The Right to Sue Letter is a necessary prerequisite to an employee's private
action against his employer. Id. The Right to Sue letter signifies the EEOC's permission for
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letter enables the employee to file a private action against the employer
after the EEOC has completed its own investigation and has decided not
7
to bring charges against the employer.
Upon receiving the EEOC's Right to Sue letter, the employee has ninety
days to file in a federal district court a complaint against his employer. 8
The question of when the ninety day filing period begins to run has generated
controversy among the federal circuit courts of appeals. 9 The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, in considering when
the ninety day filing period begins, have adopted a flexible rule.' 0 Under
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' flexible rule, the ninety day period begins
to run when a person of suitable age and discretion receives the Right to
Sue letter at the address that the plaintiff gave the EEOC." The flexible
rule also allows for a case by case determination of whether equitable tolling
of the filing period is appropriate.' 2 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, however, has adopted an actual receipt rule, which

the employee to bring his own suit against his employer. Id. Title VII suggests that the EEOC
issue notice, which the EEOC calls a Right to Sue letter to the employee within 120 days after
the employee files a complaint with the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Although Title VII does not
expressly provide for a "Right to Sue" letter, Title VII expressly states that the EEOC must
provide a plaintiff with some form of notice of his right to sue his employer in a private civil
action. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The EEOC has enacted its own regulations that require the EEOC
to send to the plaintiff a Right to Sue letter as notice of the plaintiff's right to institute a
private action against his employer. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 (1986). The EEOC regulations allow
a plaintiff to request a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC 180 days after the plaintiff has
filed charges with the EEOC. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25(b)-(c) (1986). The plaintiff may request the
letter regardless of the EEOC's disposition of the case. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1982).
8. Id. Originally, Title VII required a plaintiff to file a complaint within 30 days after
the plaintiff's receipt of a Right to Sue letter. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706e, 42 U.S.C
2000e (1964). In 1972 Congress extended the filing period to ninety days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(0(1) (1972). Recognizing the inadequacy of the original thirty day filing period, Congress
chose to expand the filing period to give a plaintiff more time to obtain counsel and file a
complaint. See CONaRaNcE REPORT, supra note 4, 7167-68 (explaining that 90 days is adequate
time for plaintiff to file Title VII complaint against his employer).
9. See infra notes 44-97 and accompanying text (discussing opposing rules for establishing beginning of 90 day filing period); see also Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d
1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (adopting flexible rule); Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086,
1087 (lth Cir. 1982) (applying flexible rule); Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and
Warehouse Union, 585 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying actual receipt rule).
10. See Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding
that filing period begins upon receipt of Right to Sue letter at plaintiff's address unless
principles of equity demand tolling of statute until plaintiff actually receives notice); Bell v.
Eagle Motor Lines, 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that filing period begins when person receives
letter at plaintiff's address, and that court equitably may toll filing period); see infra notes
59-97 and accompanying text (discussing rule that filing period begins when plaintiff receives
Right to Sue letter at his residence).
11. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text (discussing Fifth Circuit's application
of equitable tolling in Franks).
12. Id.
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measures the ninety day period from the time a plaintiff actually receives4
the Right to Sue letter.' 3 In Harvey v. City of New Bern PoliceDepartment
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered when
the ninety day filing period for an employee's Title VII action against an
employer begins to run. 5
In Harvey the plaintiff was a black police officer who filed with the
EEOC charges against the New Bern Police Department. 16 The plaintiff
alleged that the New Bern Police Department, in violation of Title VII,
preferentially promoted a white officer to a position for which both the
plaintiff and the white officer had applied. 17 The EEOC failed in its attempts
at conciliation between the plaintiff and employer, but decided not to
institute an action against the employer because of a lack of evidence to
support the plaintiff's claim. 8 On November 26, 1985, the EEOC issued a
Right to Sue letter to the plaintiff. 19 The plaintiff's wife signed for the

letter upon its delivery to the plaintiff's home on November 27, because
the plaintiff was not at home when the letter arrived.20 Subsequently, the
plaintiff and his wife left town for a holiday trip, and the plaintiff's wife
did not give the letter to the plaintiff, or tell him that the letter had arrived
until six days after she had received the letter. 2' On February 26, 1986,
ninety-one days after the plaintiffs wife had signed for the letter, the
plaintiff's attorney filed a complaint in the United States District Court for22
the Eastern District of North Carolina against the plaintiff's employer.
Claiming that the plaintiff did not file his complaint within the ninety day
filing period for which Title VII provides, the defendant moved for summary
judgement.23 The district court granted the defendant's motion, finding that
the plaintiff had not filed his complaint within the ninety day period
provided for by Title VII.24 Because the plaintiff had offered no equitable
ground that would allow the court to toll the filing period, the court held
that the untimely filing of the complaint barred the plaintiff's cause of
action.-5
The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the district court
13. See Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union, 585
F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that 90 day filing period commenced upon plaintiff's
actual receipt of Right to Sue letter); infra notes 48-58 and accompanying text (discussing
Seventh Circuit's application of actual receipt rule in Archie).
14. 813 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1987).
15. Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't, 813 F.2d 652, 653 (4th Cir. 1987).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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erred in holding that the filing period began when the plaintiff's wife
received the Right to Sue letter. 26 The plaintiff urged that the district court
should have tolled the filing period until the plaintiff actually received the
Right to Sue letter. 27 Because the plaintiff's complaint presented the Fourth
Circuit with an issue of first impression, the court examined the two existing
rules that dictate When the filing period begins. 2 The Fourth Circuit initially
noted that, under the actual receipt rule, the filing period begins to run
when an employee actually receives a Right to Sue letter. 29 The Fourth
Circuit also noted that some courts have determined that the actual receipt
rule effectively enables claimants to extend their deadlines for filing Title
VII actions at will.3 0 In analyzing the actual receipt rule, the Fourth Circuit
determined that the actual receipt rule did not best serve the congressional
intent underlying Title VII. a 1 According to the Fourth Circuit, Congress
limited the filing period under Title VII to ninety days to force a plaintiff
expeditiously to commence a Title VII action against his employer. 32 The
Fourth Circuit implied that because the actual receipt rule enables a plaintiff
indefinitely to extend the filing deadline by delaying his actual receipt of
the letter, the actual receipt rule circumvents the congressional intent underlying the ninety day filing period.33
Finding that the flexible rule better serves congressional intent, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the actual receipt rule and instead chose to adopt
the flexible rule to determine when the filing period begins.3 4 With the
adoption of the flexible rule, the Fourth Circuit impliedly adopted the
reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit that a plaintiff should not be able to
35
enjoy a manipulable open ended extension of the ninety day filing period.
The Fourth Circuit explained that the flexible rule would require a district
court to determine on a case by case basis whether equitable considerations
dictate that the court should toll the filing period. 36 Thus, because the
Fourth Circuit found that the flexible rule best served congressional desire

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union,
585 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that 90 day filing period began upon plaintiff's
actual receipt of Right to Sue letter); see infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing
Seventh Circuit's adoption of actual receipt rule).
30. See Harvey, 813 F.2d at 654 (noting Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' criticism of actual
receipt rule).
31. Harvey, 813 F.2d at 654.
32. Id.
33. See id (implying that congressional desire for expedition is grounds for rejection of
actual receipt rule).
34. Id.
35. Harvey, 813 F.2d at 654.
36. Harvey, 813 F.2d at 654; see Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250
(5th Cir. 1985) (explaining how court applies flexible rule by examining each case individually
to see if circumstances require tolling of 90 day filing period); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974) (same).
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the requirements of justice, the Fourth Circuit adopted
for expedition and
7
the flexible rule.1
Applying the flexible rule to the plaintiffs allegations in Harvey, the
Fourth Circuit found that the filing period began to run on November 27,
1985, when the plaintiff's wife received and signed for the Right to Sue
letter.38 Because the plaintiff filed the complaint against the defendant on
February 26, 1986, ninety-one days after the plaintiff's wife had received
the letter, the Fourth Circuit held that the Title VII statute of limitation
barred the plaintiff's complaint. 39 Noting that the flexible rule allows for
equitable tolling of the filing period in egregious situations, however, the
Fourth Circuit considered whether the circumstances of the plaintiff's delayed filing warranted equitable tolling. 40 The court held that equitable
tolling was inappropriate because the six day delay in plaintiff's actual
receipt of the Right to Sue letter did not disadvantage the plaintiff by
depriving the plaintiff of adequate time to file a complaint against his
employer. 4' Furthermore, the court observed that the plaintiff failed to
prove that circumstances beyond his control prevented him from filing the
complaint within the ninety day filing period. 42 Thus, the Fourth Circuit
court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor
affirmed the district
43
defendant.
the
of
With one exception, the United States Courts of Appeals consistently
have used the flexible rule in determining when the ninety day filing period
under Title VII begins. 44 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit is the only Circuit Court to reject the flexible rule and instead adopt
the actual receipt rule. 45 In Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and
Warehouse Workers Union46 the Seventh Circuit considered whether the
filing period started when the plaintiff's wife received the Right to Sue
letter, or when the plaintiff himself received the letter. 47 In Archie the
48
plaintiff filed with the EEOC a discrimination action against his employer.

37. Harvey, 813 F.2d at 654.
38. Id.

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id.
44. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text (discussing flexible rule's application in
Espinoza). But see infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of actual
receipt rule by United States Court of Appeals for Seventh Circuit).
45. See Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union, 585
F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that filing period begins when plaintiff actually receives
Right to Sue letter); infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing Seventh Circuit's
rationale for adopting actual receipt rule in Archie).
46. 585 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978).
47. Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F.2d
210, 213-15 (7th Cir. 1978).
48. Id. at 213. In Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers, and Warehouse Workers
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The EEOC found no ground upon which to base its own suit against the

defendant and, therefore, issued a Right to Sue letter to the plaintiff. 49 The
plaintiff's wife received the letter on July 28, 1976, but the plaintiff claimed
that he did not receive the letter until August 6, 1976.50 The plaintiff filed
a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District

of Illinois ninety-one days after the plaintiff's wife received the Right to
Sue Letter.5' The district court dismissed with prejudice the plaintiff's
complaint holding that the plaintiff did not file his complaint within the
ninety-day filing period. 2 The plaintiff appealed to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing that, because he had filed his
complaint within ninety days of receiving the Right to Sue letter, he had

complied with the congressional intent underlying the ninety day filing
period by quickly filing his complaint.53 In adopting the actual receipt rule,
the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the plaintiff's right to sue his employer

should not depend on the circumstances surrounding the delivery of the
Right to Sue Letter.5 4 The Archie court expressed concern that the delayed
receipt of a letter would disadvantage a plaintiff because the plaintiff was
not aware of his right to sue until he actually received the letter. 55 Finally,

the Archie court observed that, generally, courts liberally have construed
the filing period limitations of Title VII to effectuate Title VII's remedial
purpose. 56 The Seventh Circuit, therefore, liberally construed the filing

Union the plaintiff was a black man whom the defendant employed as a dockworker. Id. The
defendant's foreman discharged the plaintiff for allegedly tallying freight improperly. Id. The
plaintiff appealed the discharge to his union, which convinced the defendant to rehire the
plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff signed an agreement with the defendant stating that, if the plaintiff
failed to perform his duties adequately in the following year, the defendant irrevocably could
terminate the plaintiff. Id. Within four months after returning to work for the defendant, the
defendant dismissed the plaintiff for allegedly erring in loading freight. Id. Subsequently, the
plaintiff filed with the EEOC a charge of racial discrimination against the defendant, alleging
that the defendant dismissed the plaintiff because the plaintiff was black. Id.
49. Id. at 213. Because the State of Illinois had an Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission ("IFEPC"), the EEOC referred the plaintiff's charge of racial discrimination to
the IFEPC in accordance with Title VII. Id.; see supra note 3 (discussing state commission's
intervention in discrimination actions). After conducting an investigation into the plaintiff's
charge of employment discrimination, the IFEPC found no basis for the plaintiff's allegations.
Archie, 585 F.2d at 213. Accordingly, the IFEPC reported to the EEOC the lack of a factual
basis for the plaintiff's allegations, and the EEOC adopted the IFEPC's findings. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Archie, 585 F.2d at 214.
Id.
Id. at 212.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 215.
Id.

56. Id. at 216 (agreeing with Franks opinion that courts liberally have construed Title
VII provisions); see Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1974). The
United States Supreme Court has reasoned that courts liberally should construe Title VII
provisions to promote the remedial nature of Title VII. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522,
525-27 (1971). For example, in Love v. Pullman Co., the Supreme Court considered whether
the plaintiff had filed with the EEOC a charge of discrimination against his employer in
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period limitation of Title VII and held that the filing period began when
the plaintiff actually received the Right to Sue letter, rather than when the
plaintiff's wife received the letter.1
Unlike the Seventh Circuit in Archie, the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have applied the flexible rule
in deciding when the ninety day filing period begins.58 The flexible rule
designates as the beginning of the ninety day filing period for a Title VII
action the delivery of the Right to Sue letter to a person of suitable age
and discretion at the plaintiff's address.5 9 The flexible rule further allows a
court equitably to toll the filing period when circumstances beyond the
plaintiff's control prevent him from filing a timely complaint in a district
court.6 For example, the Fifth Circuit adopted the flexible rule in Espinoza
conformity with Title VII. Id. at 524.-The plaintiff was a black porter-in-charge for the
defendant. Id. at 523. Alleging that the defendant did not pay black and white porters the
same wage for the same work, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission (CCRC) in accordance with Title V1I's provisions. Id.; see supranote 3 (discussing
state commissions' intervention in discrimination actions). The CCRC did not reach a resolution
of the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant that satisfied the plaintiff, and the plaintiff
subsequently wrote a letter of inquiry to the EEOC alleging that the defendant discriminated
in its wage practices. Love, 404 U.S. 522, 524. The EEOC treated the letter of inquiry as a
complaint for the purpose of starting the necessary proceedings under Title VII. Id. The
EEOC, however, did not formally file the letter as a complaint. Id. The EEOC failed in its
attempts to obtain the defendant's voluntary compliance with Title VII and issued a Right to
Sue letter to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff filed in the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado charges against his employer, alleging that the defendant's discriminatory
wage practices violated Title VII. Id. at 523. The district court treated the plaintiffs initial
inquiry letter to the EEOC as a complaint for the purposes of Title VII. Love v. Pullman
Co., 430 F.2d 49, 52 (10th Cir. 1969). Because the plaintiff filed a Title VII complaint after
the filing period ended, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. Id. The United
States Supreme Court considered whether the plaintiff had filed a timely complaint within the
provisions of Title VII. Love, 404 U.S. at 523. The Supreme Court reasoned that, if a court
dismissed a plaintiff's claim because the EEOC improperly treated the letter of inquiry as a
complaint, a court would not effectuate the remedial purpose of Title VII by strictly enforcing
the complaint filing requirement under Title VII. Id. at 526. The Supreme Court held, therefore,
that the plaintiff filed a valid complaint by sending a letter of inquiry to the EEOC. Id.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff filed a timely complaint in
accordance with Title VII's provisions. Id.
57. Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F.2d
210, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1978).
58. See infra notes 61-75 and accompanying text (discussing adoption of flexible rule in
Espinoza by United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); infra note 64 (discussing
Eleventh Circuit's application of flexible rule in Lewis v. Conners Steel Co.).
59. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (stating that, in Espinoza, Fifth Circuit
held that flexible rule filing period begins when person of suitable age and discretion receives
Right to Sue letter at plaintiff's address).
60. See Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding
that unusual circumstances surrounding plaintiff's receipt of Right to Sue letter warranted
equitable tolling); infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holding of
Franks); see also McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastics Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 884-85 (holding that
unusual circumstances surrounding plaintiff's filing of complaint warranted equitable tolling);
infra note 73 (discussing reasoning of United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Texas in McQueen).
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v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Company,6' to determine whether the ninety
day filing period began when the plaintiff's wife received the Right to Sue
letter, or eight days later, when the plaintiff actually received the letter.6
In Espinoza the plaintiff filed with the EEOC a discrimination complaint
against the plaintiff's employer. 63 Subsequently, the EEOC issued a Right
to Sue letter, which the plaintiff's wife received on May 4, 1983.64 The
plaintiff, however, was out of town and did not actually receive the letter
until May 12, 1983.65 Ninety-two days after the plaintiff's wife received the
letter and eighty-four days after the plaintiff received the letter, the plaintiff
filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas
a complaint against his employer. 66 The district court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff filed the

61. 754 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1985).
62. Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1249 (5th Cir. 1985). Like the Fifth
Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit consistently has adhered to the flexible rule. Lewis v. Conners
Steel Company, 673 F.2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 1982). In Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first implied the flexible rule as a
case by case analysis that allows a court equitably to toll the ninety day filing period under
Title VII. Id. In Lewis the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the plaintiff filed a complaint
against his employer within the ninety day filing period. Id.In Lewis the plaintiff filed with
the EEOC a complaint charging that the plaintiff's employer fired the plaintiff because the
plaintiff was black. Id. at 1241. The plaintiff temporarily was living with a friend, and
therefore gave the EEOC the friend's address. Id. The plaintiff moved from his friends's
house during the time the EEOC was conducting its own investigation, but did not inform
the EEOC of the plaintiff's new address. Id. The EEOC issued a Right to Sue letter to the
plaintiff. Id. The EEOC's records showed that the EEOC received a registered mail receipt
three days after the EEOC sent the letter to the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, however, alleged
that he never received the letter. Id. The plaintiff contacted the EEOC, inquiring about the
Right to Sue letter, three months after the EEOC had delivered the first letter to the plaintiff's
old address. Id. The EEOC gave the plaintiff a copy of the original letter. Id. The plaintiff
filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
within four days after he received the copy of the original letter. Id. The plaintiff had filed
his complaint more than 90 days after the EEOC delivered the first letter to the plaintiff's
temporary address. Id. The district court determined that the 90 day filing period began upon
the delivery of the original letter to the plaintiff's temporary address, and dismissed the case
because the plaintiff filed his complaint after the 90 day filing period had expired. Id. The
plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit. Id.
In determining when a court should start the filing period in a Title VII claim, the
Eleventh Circuit initially noted that the court would not provide the plaintiff with a manipulable, open-ended time extension of the filing period. Id. at 1242. The Eleventh Circuit
explained that fair and reasonable standards dictated that a plaintiff should bear some
responsibility for the timely filing of his complaint by informing the EEOC of any address
changes. Id. at 1243. Because the plaintiff did not give his new address to the EEOC, the
court refused to toll the filing period until the plaintiff received the second letter. Id. Instead,
the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further evidentiary hearings with the
implied understanding that the district court should apply the flexible rule. Id.
63. Fspinoza at 1248.

64. Id. at 1249.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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complaint after the ninety day limitation under Title VII had expired. 67
The plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's decision to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the
circumstances surrounding his receipt of the letter required the court to toll

the filing period until the plaintiff actually received the letter. 6s The Fifth
Circuit initially noted that generally, courts will serve the purposes of the

Civil Rights Act if the courts interpret Title VII to require that the ninety
day filing period commence upon delivery of the Right to Sue letter to the
plaintiff's address. 69 The Espinoza court explained, however, that a court

could toll the filing period to prevent any inequity that might result if the
court strictly imposed the ninety day limitation. 70 The Fifth Circuit listed

7
four circumstances requiring a court equitably to toll the filing period. '
First, the Fifth Circuit noted that, when the EEOC gives a plaintiff inadequate notice of the plaintiff's right to sue by sending a letter other than
a Right to Sue letter, a court should toll the filing period until the plaintiff
received the actual Right to Sue letter.7 2 Second, the Fifth Circuit observed
that a court should toll the filing period when the court delays granting a
plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel and, consequently, causes the
plaintiff to file his complaint after the ninety day period has expired.73

67. Id. at 1248.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1249 (holding that commencement of ninety day period on date that notice
delivered to plaintiff's address ordinarily will serve purpose of Title VII); infra notes 109-18
and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent of Title VII).
70. Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
that court should toll filing period to prevent inequity when circumstances dictate).
71. See Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit referred to a United States Supreme Court case, Baldwin County Welcome Center v.
Brown, when the Fifth Circuit listed some of the circumstances that might justify equitable
tolling of 90 day filing period. See Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147,
151 (1983) (discussing circumstances that justify equitable tolling of filing period); see also
Suarez v. Little Havana Activities, 721 F.2d 338, 340 (llth Cir. 1983) (citing Baldwin
circumstances that may justify equitable tolling of 90 day filing period).
72. Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251; see Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466
U.S. 147, 151 (1983) (stating that if EEOC gives inadequate notice to plaintiff, court may toll
filing period); Gates v. Georgia Pac. Corp., 492 F.2d 292, 295 (9th Cir. 1974) (tolling filing
period because EEOC did not send plaintiff adequate notice of his right to sue his employer
in private civil action).
73. Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251; see Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 151 (holding that equity
justifies tolling filing period when motion for appointment of counsel is pending); Harris v.
Walgreen's Distrib. Center, 456 F.2d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 1972) (same); Harris v. National Tea
Co., 454 F.2d 307, 310 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that if motion for appointment of counsel
prevents plaintiff from filing timely complaint, court equitably may toll filing period); McQueen
v. E.M.C. Plastics Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 882-83 (E.D. Tex. 1969) (stating that pending
motion for appointment of counsel warrants tolling of filing period). In McQueen v. E.M.C.
Plastics Co., the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas considered
whether to toll the filing period because of the unusual circumstances under which the plaintiff
filed the complaint. McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastics Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 882-83 (E.D. Tex.
1969). In McQueen, the plaintiff requested the district court to appoint counsel to the plaintiff.
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Third, the court noted that equitable tolling also applies when a court leads
a plaintiff to believe that the plaintiff has satisfied all prerequisites to
maintaining a Title VII cause of action. 74 Finally, the court noted that
equitable tolling applies if a defendant deceptively has prevented a plaintiff
from filing a timely complaint. 75 The court held that the plaintiff's absence
at the time his wife received the letter did not constitute a circumstance
warranting equitable tolling. 76 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the filing
77
period began when the plaintiff's wife received the Right to Sue letter.
The Fifth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the plaintiff did not file his
complaint within the ninety day limitation and affirmed the district court's
decision to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint."
In adopting the flexible rule, the Espinoza court noted that a court
using the flexible rule equitably can toll the filing period under Title VII
when circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control prevented the plaintiff
from filing his complaint within the filing period. 79 In Espinoza the Fifth
Circuit cited a previous Fifth Circuit decision to illustrate a set of circumstances requiring equitable tolling.' 0 In Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Company" the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit conId. The court, however, did not appoint counsel until after the 90 day filing period had
expired. Id. Furthermore, the terminal illness of the attorney's wife severely limited the
attorney's ability to represent the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff's attorney had determined that
the plaintiff had no ground for a lawsuit against the plaintiff's employer and notified the
plaintiff that he would not file a lawsuit against the defendant. Id. Moreover, the judge who
had appointed counsel for the plaintiff died before making any further decision in the
proceeding, requiring a new judge to acquaint himself with the plaintiff's circumstances. Id.
Accordingly, the district court found that the plaintiff had fulfilled her obligations to the best
of her ability, and because the circumstances surrounding the filing of the plaintiff's complaint
were beyond her control, the court tolled the filing period until the court could appoint another
attorney to represent the plaintiff. Id. at 884.
74. Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251; see Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 151 (stating that court may
apply equitable tolling when court led plaintiff to believe that plaintiff had fulfilled all
necessary requirements for suit); Carlile v. South Routt School Dist. RE 3-J, 652 F.2d 981,
986 (10th Cir. 1981) (same).
75. Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1251; see Baldwin, 466 U.S. at 151 (noting that if defendant's
intentional misconduct influences plaintiff to delay filing of complaint, court may equitably
toll filing period); Villasenor v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 640 F.2d 207, 208 (9th Cir. 1981)
(holding that defendant's misconduct of promising to settle dispute out of court deceived
plaintiff to delay filing complaint, and therefore, justified equitable tolling of filing period).
76. Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1985). In Espinoza,
the plaintiff alleged that he had been out of town when the Right to Sue letter arrived at his
home. Id. at 1249. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the
plaintiff's argument that his absence justified equitable tolling of the filing period until the
plaintiff had received the letter. Id. at 1249-50.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1251.
79. Id. at 1250; see McQueen v. E.M.C. Plastics Co., 302 F.Supp. 881, 882-83 (E.D.
Tex. 1969) (holding that situations beyond plaintiff's control, which prevented plaintiff from
filing timely complaint, justified tolling filing period); supra note 72 (discussing facts of
McQueen which required equitable tolling).
80. Espinoza, 754 F.2d at 1249.
81. 495 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1974).
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sidered whether the circumstances of the plaintiff's delayed receipt of his
Right to Sue letter warranted equitable tolling.8 2 In Franksthe plaintiff filed
with the EEOC charges against his employer for discriminatory promotion
practices. 83 The EEOC tried to conciliate the plaintiff and his employer,
but the attempts failed, and the EEOC decided that it had no grounds upon
which to sue and issued a Right to Sue letter to the plaintiff. s4 The plaintiff's
nine-year-old nephew signed for the Right to Sue letter.8 5 The nephew then6
lost the letter and told the plaintiff that a letter had arrived for the plaintiff.1
The plaintiff, however, had no idea that the letter which had arrived for
the plaintiff was the Right to Sue letter. 7 Because he received no word
from the EEOC for approximately a year after the first letter had arrived,
the plaintiff contacted the EEOC and learned that the EEOC had delivered
the Right to Sue letter. 8 Subsequently, the EEOC issued a second letter to
the plaintiff.8 9 The plaintiff received the second letter and within thirty days
of receiving the second letter filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia. ° The district court dismissed
the plaintiff's complaint, holding that the plaintiff did not file his complaint
within the filing period which follows the EEOC's issuance of the initial
Right to Sue letter. 9' The plaintiff appealed the district court's decision to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.92
The Fifth Circuit first determined that the filing period began when the
plaintiff received the second letter.93 The court reasoned that the nephew's
loss of the letter warranted equitable tolling of the filing period until the
plaintiff received the second letter.9 4 The court also reasoned that the
nephew's loss of the letter constituted a situation over which the plaintiff
had no control. 95 The Franks court refused to condition the plaintiff's right
to sue on circumstances beyond the plaintiff's control.9 6 To resolve the

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 404-06 (5th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 402.
Id.at 403.
Id.
Id.
Id.

88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id. In Franks, the filing period was 30 days because Congress had not extended the
filing period to 90 days at the time of the plaintiff's suit. Id.; see supra note 8 and accompanying
text (discussing congressional extension of complaint filing period from 30 to 90 days).
91. Id.

92. Id. at 398.
93. Id.at 405.
94. Id.

95. Id. In Franks, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the plaintiff's nephew's loss of the Right to Sue letter was similar to the EEOC's loss of
the letter in multitudinous paper work, or the postal service's loss of the letter. Id. Therefore,
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that loss of the first letter was a circumstance beyond the plaintiff's
control. Id.
96. See id. (discussing instance of fortuitous circumstance in Franks). In Franks, the
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unfairness of the Franks situation, therefore, the Fifth Circuit applied the
flexible rule and equitably tolled the ninety day filing period until the
plaintiff received the second Right to Sue letter. 97
The flexible rule allows a court to toll the ninety day filing period when
circumstances beyond a plaintiff's control prevent the plaintiff from filing
a timely complaint and thus is an efficient and reasonable rule for a court
to apply in determining when the Title VII filing period begins to run. 9 In
contrast to the flexible rule, the actual receipt rule entails several problems. 99
First, under the actual receipt rule, a court must distinguish between when
the plaintiff actually receives the letter and when another person in the
plaintiff's household receives the letter.'0° The distinction is problematic
because the court further must inquire into the circumstances surrounding
the letter's delivery and who actually receives the Right to Sue letter to
determine the beginning of the ninety day filing period.' 0 ' The Seventh
Circuit in Archie attempted to avoid the problem of determining when a
plaintiff receives the Right to Sue letter by suggesting that the EEOC require
delivery of the letter to the plaintiff himself. 10 2 By requiring delivery to the
plaintiff, however, the Seventh Circuit would impose an administratively
infeasible requirement on the EEOC. 03 Requiring the EEOC to deliver the
letter only to the plaintiff would waste time and money, because the EEOC
might have to deliver the letter several times before catching the plaintiff
at home at the time of delivery. 04
The actual receipt rule not only creates a problem for courts in establishing the beginning of the filing period, but it also places a plaintiff at
an advantage over a defendant. 05 Under the actual receipt rule, the plaintiff
has an advantage over the defendant because he indefinitely can extend the
filing period deadline by manipulating the date on which he actually receives
the Right to Sue letter. 106 The plaintiff effectively could extend the ninety

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted several fortuitous circumnstances
that require equitable tolling. Id. at 404-05. The Fifth Circuit noted that when the EEOC's
workload, mistakes, or lack of diligence delay proceedings, and prevent a plaintiff from filing
a timely complaint, the court should toll the filing period. Id. at 405.
97. Id.
98. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of flexible rule).
99. See infra notes 100-09 and accompanying text (discussing inequities of actual receipt
rule).
100. Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union, 585 F.2d
210, 215-16 (7th Cir. 1978) (discussing courts examination of plaintiff's actual receipt of Right
to Sue letter).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 216.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (11th Cir. 1982) (examining
possibility of plaintiff's manipulating beginning of filing period under actual receipt rule, and
thus placing plaintiff in advantageous position over defendant); infra notes 105-108 and
accompanying text (same).
106. Archie at 215. But see Mouriz v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1025, 1027
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day limitation period if the plaintiff were willing to testify that he did not
receive the letter until sometime after the date of delivery.10 7 The plaintiff
also could extend the filing period by neglecting to find or open the letter
until the plaintiff considered the time ripe for his suit.10s Finally, the actual
receipt rule fails to effectuate the remedial purposes and efficiency goals
that underlie the ninety day filing period of Title VII.109 Congress enacted
Title VII to discourage discriminatory employment practices. 10 Congress
desired that employees and employers resolve their differences quickly and

(E.D. La. 1977). In Mouriz, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana considered whether the 90 day filing period began when the plaintiff's wife received
the Right to Sue letter, or when the plaintiff actually received the letter. Id. The plaintiff filed
a discrimination action against the defendant for refusing to hire the plaintiff. Id. at 1026.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to hire the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's
national origin. Id. After investigating the plaintiff's allegations, the EEOC mailed a Right to
Sue letter to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's wife received the letter at the plaintiff's address.
Id. at 1027. The plaintiff's wife placed the letter on the plaintiff's desk, but the plaintiff
contended that the/ltter was on his desk for several days before he actually read the letter.
Id. After the filing period had ended, the plaintiff filed in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana a suit against the defendant. Id. The court noted that
the filing period began when the plaintiff's wife received the letter because the plaintiff had
the opportunity, from the time his wife received the letter, to learn of the letter's contents.
Id. The court also reasoned that adopting an actual receipt rule would enable the plaintiff to
toll the filing period for an indefinite period of time. Id. The court analogized the Right to
Sue letter to a subpoena and complaint, which both are effective when they are served, not
when the receiver reads them. Id. The court analogized the complaint and subpoena to the
Right to Sue letter, because all three documents inform the receiver of his rights or duties in
civil actions. Id. Because the Right to Sue letter is similar to a complaint and subpoena, the
court determined that the Right to Sue letter also is effective upon delivery. Id. Therefore,
the court held that the filing period began when the plaintiff's wife received the letter, not
when the plaintiff actually read the letter. Id.
107. See Krieger v. Republic Van Lines of S.V., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 335, 337 (S.D. Tex.
1977). In Krieger, the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas expressed
concern that, under the actual receipt rule, a plaintiff at will could extend the 90 day filing
period. Id. The court noted that the only objective evidence of the date of receipt of the Right
to Sue letter is the certified mail receipt. Id. Thus, the district court observed that, in adopting
an actual receipt rule, a court could allow a plaintiff to extend the filing period by testifying
that he actually received the letter at a date subsequent to the date on the certified mail
receipt. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982). Congress set definite
limits on the amount of time for a plaintiff to file an employee discrimination complaint with
the EEOC. Id. § 2000e-5(b). Congress also set definite limits on the amount of time that the
EEOC can work for conciliation between the plaintiff and defendant. Id. Congress set a 90
day limit on the length of time within which a plaintiff must file a complaint in district court
after receiving a Right to Sue letter. Id. § 2000e-5(f). The time limits that Congress imposed
under Title VII evidence the congressional intent to benefit both employees and employers by
forcing a quick resolution of the conflicts that arise between an employee and his employer.
See Hendrix v. Memorial Hosp. of Galveston County, 776 F.2d 1255, 1256 (5th Cir. 1985)
(noting that 90 day limitation prevents prosecution of stale claims and thus enhances remedial
nature of Title VII to settle conflicts between employer and employee).
110. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (discussing Title VII's remedial purpose
in settling disputes between employer and employee).
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efficiently, when discriminatory employment practices occur."' The actual
receipt rule, however, hinders the purposes underlying the ninety day filing
period by allowing a plaintiff indefinitely to extend the filing period and
2
thus prolonging disputes between employers and employees."
Unlike the actual receipt rule, the flexible rule fulfills the Congressional
intent underlying Title VII." a Congress intended the filing period to be long
enough to allow a plaintiff who has no knowledge of law or limitations
periods to file a timely complaint." 4 Congress believed that ninety days
gave a plaintiff sufficient time to file a complaint." 5 By extending the
period, which originally was thirty days in length, to ninety days, Congress
evidenced its intent to provide sufficient time for a plaintiff to file a Title
VII complaint. 116 Additionally, Congress designed Title VII to resolve employment discrimination complaints quickly and thus benefit both the employee and his employer." 7 Accordingly, Congress imposed on Title VII
plaintiffs a ninety day filing period to force plaintiffs quickly to file their
discrimination claims against their employers." 8 By strictly enforcing the
ninety day statute of limitations, the flexible rule supports Congress' belief
that courts quickly should resolve employment discrimination claims.
The flexible rule allows a plaintiff sufficient time to file a complaint,
and, under the flexible rule, a court that applies the flexible rule determines
when to extend the filing period instead of the plaintiff determining the
beginning of the filing period. " 9 The certified mail requirement under the
EEOC regulations about Right to Sue letters gives a trial court a documented
date to signal the start of the filing period. 20 A court applying the flexible

111. Id.
112. See Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (Ilth Cir. 1982) (reiterating
Lewis opinion which states that actual receipt rule allows plaintiff indefinitely to extend filing
period contrary to congressional intent).
113. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent behind
placing statutory limit on claims brought under Title VII).
114. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7167-68 (discussing congressional intent
to facilitate plaintiffs by giving plaintiffs sufficient time to file Title VII complaint).
115. See id (stating that 90 day period is sufficient time to file a Title VII complaint in
district court).
116. Id.; see Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union,
585 F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (interpreting extension of filing period as evidence of
congressional intent that plaintiff have sufficient time to file complaint); supra note 8 and
accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to provide plaintiff with sufficient time to
file Title VII claim).
117. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7167-68 (discussing congressional intent
to expedite employee's claims against employers).
118. Id.
119. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text (discussing manner in which court
applying flexible rule determines when filing period begins).
120. See Cook v. Providence Hosp., 820 F.2d 176, 179 (6th Cir. 1987) (EEOC sent Right
to Sue letter to plaintiff by certified mail); Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't, 813
F.2d 652, 653 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Jones v. Madison Serv. Corp., 744 F.2d 1309, 1311 (7th
Cir. 1984) (same); Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086, 1086 (l1th Cir. 1982)
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rule establishes the documented date as the beginning of the filing period,
but may ignore the certified mailing date and toll the filing period if the
circumstances require equitable tolling.' 21 Furthermore, under the flexible
rule, the court can examine the circumstances that prevented the plaintiff
from filing within the ninety day limitation to determine whether the plaintiff
had any control in filing his complaint. 122 If the circumstances were within
the plaintiff's control, the court does not toll the filing period.12 1 If the

circumstances were not within the plaintiffs control, the court tolls the

filing period.' 24 A court applying the flexible rule, therefore, adheres to the
ninety day filing period and prevents the plaintiff from determining when
the complaint filing period begins.'2
In Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Department, the Fourth Circuit

considered when the plaintiff's ninety day filing period under Title VII

begins to run. 26 In Harvey the Fourth Circuit correctly rejected the actual
receipt rule. 27 By adopting the flexible rule to determine the beginning of
the Title VII complaint filing period, the Fourth Circuit fulfilled Congress'

intent to limit the complaint filing period to ninety days and expedite a
plaintiff's employment discrimination claim.121 In addition to quickly resolving civil rights disputes between employers and employees under Title
VII, the flexible rule also provides a plaintiff with sufficient time to file his
(same); Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F.2d 1240, 1241 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); Krieger v. Republic Van
Lines of the S.W., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 335, 336-37 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (same).
The courts that have adopted the flexible rule have adopted the standard that any person
of suitable age and discretion at the plaintiff's address may receive the letter for the purposes
of Title VII. See Krieger v. Republic Van Lines of the S.W., Inc., 435 F.Supp. 335, 337 (S.D.
Tex. 1977) (explaining that plaintiff receives Right to Sue letter when person of suitable age
and discretion signs for letter at plaintiff's residence).
121. Compare Archie v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers, 585
F.2d 210, 215 (7th Cir. 1978) (extending, under actual receipt rule, beginning of filing period
beyond certified mailing date, because plaintiff alleged that he had received letter several days
after date on certified mail records) with Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 754 F.2d 1247,
1250 (5th Cir. 1985) (court began filing period on date which certified mail records established
as date that plaintiff received Right to Sue letter).
122. See supra notes 70-75 and accompanying text (explaining that courts may toll filing
period if plaintiff establishes circumstances that justify tolling).
123. Baldwin County Welcome Center v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984) (stating that
court cannot toll filing period unless circumstances beyond plaintiff's control prevent timely
filing of Title VII complaint); Bell v. Eagle Motor Lines, Inc., 693 F.2d 1086, 1087 (11th Cir.
1982) (same); Lewis v. Conners Steel Co., 673 F.2d 1240, 1242 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); Mouriz
v. Avondale Shipyard, Inc., 428 F. Supp. 1025, 1027 (E.D. La. 1977) (same).
124. See supra notes 71-75 (citing cases in which court has tolled filing period because
circumstances of filing were beyond plaintiff's control).
125. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text (explaining that flexible rule allows
court rather than plaintiff to determine beginning of filing period).
126. Harvey v. City of New Bern Police Dep't, 813 F.2d 652, 653-54 (4th Cir. 1987).
127. See supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text (discussing analysis and rejection of
actual receipt rule by United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).
128. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to
expedite plaintiff's Title VII claims).
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complaint in a district court. 129 Finally, the flexible rule promotes equitable

results because it allows a court to take into account the individual circumstances of each case, thus allowing a court to toll the filing period in
appropriate cases. 3 0
MICHAEL WILLIAM TAN

129. See supra notes 8, 115 and accompanying text (concluding that 90 days is sufficient
time for plaintiff to file complaint).
130. See supra notes 79-97 and accompanying text (discussing court's application of tolling
filing period under flexible rule in appropriate circumstances); supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text (listing circumstances when court equitably may toll Title VII filing period).

